A Man Without a Mandate: The Legal Case That Steve Witkoff Cannot Lawfully Represent the United States—Or Ukraine

December 3, 2025

A Man Without a Mandate: The Legal Case That Steve Witkoff Cannot Lawfully Represent the United States—Or Ukraine
The Shadow Diplomacy the Founders Warned about and Sought to Prevent

Introduction: Who Actually Speaks for the United States?

Steve Witkoff is flying around the world as Donald Trump’s “special envoy.” He has negotiated with Vladimir Putin for five hours in Moscow, brokered ceasefire terms in Gaza, discussed nuclear frameworks in Oman, and drafted Ukraine peace proposals in Miami. Foreign governments from Israel to Russia describe him in official readouts as a “U.S. special envoy” or “American representative” acting on behalf of the United State

(Kremlin asset Steve Witkoff smiles as he meets with his Russian buddies to carve up Ukraine, photo by Russian photographer)

Yet there is a puzzle at the heart of his diplomatic activities: the entire legal architecture that normally makes someone an official U.S. public minister is missing.

No Senate nomination. No confirmation hearing. No statutory notification to Congress. No presence on the State Department’s Diplomatic List. An ethics disclosure that remains unsigned by the reviewing official. And—most fundamentally—no authority whatsoever from Ukraine to represent it in negotiations about its own territory and sovereignty.

This is not a policy argument about whether Witkoff’s proposals are wise or his dealmaking effective. This is a legal and institutional analysis of a threshold question: Does Steve Witkoff have lawful official capacity to represent the United States in diplomatic negotiations?

The answer, based on constitutional text, statutory requirements, Supreme Court precedent, and the documented public record, is no.

This analysis will demonstrate that Witkoff’s status is, at most, that of a politically favored private fixer operating as a “personal emissary”—not a lawfully appointed U.S. officer or public minister under the Constitution. It will show that his role embodies precisely the dangers the Founders sought to prevent through the Appointments Clause: favoritism over merit, vulnerability to foreign influence, and the exercise of sovereign power without accountability. And it will show that any claim he “represents” Ukraine in negotiations about Ukraine’s war is not merely dubious but legally absurd: Ukraine is a sovereign state with its own elected government, and that government has not empowered him.

Section 1: The Law—What It Takes To Be an Official U.S. Envoy

The Constitutional Framework: The Appointments Clause

The U.S. Constitution vests appointment power for key government positions in the President, but with a critical check: Senate oversight. Article II, Section 2, Clause 2 (the Appointments Clause) states:

“[The President] shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law: but the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.”

This requirement was not a mere formality. It was forged in the crucible of bitter experience.

The Founders’ Experience: Why Senate Consent Matters

The Appointments Clause emerged directly from catastrophic diplomatic failures under the Articles of Confederation, where Congress appointed envoys without executive coordination or adequate oversight. These failures demonstrated what happens when diplomatic appointments lack proper structure and accountability.

The Silas Deane Scandal (1776-1778): Congress appointed Deane as a secret agent to France to secure supplies and alliances. He engaged in unauthorized commercial dealings, profiteering, and fiscal irregularities—classic self-dealing by an unvetted envoy. Congressional investigations and his eventual recall in 1778 damaged U.S. credibility abroad. As Gouverneur Morris noted during the Constitutional Convention debates on September 7, 1787, the Deane affair demonstrated the dangers of ad hoc appointments without oversight, leading to corruption and the need for Senate consent to vet nominees and prevent self-dealing.

The Arthur Lee Disputes (1777-1779): Lee, appointed as commissioner to France alongside Deane and Benjamin Franklin, clashed bitterly with Deane over financial practices and authority. Lee accused Deane of embezzlement, causing division within the delegation, delayed negotiations, and a polarized Congress. This infighting undermined U.S. diplomatic efforts. Morris cited this during Convention debates as an example of Confederation-era diplomatic dysfunction requiring better appointment mechanisms. It demonstrated the risks of multiple, uncoordinated appointments leading to factionalism.

The Ralph Izard Failure (1777-1779): Izard was appointed commissioner to the Grand Duchy of Tuscany but never reached his post due to wartime travel issues. He feuded with Franklin and the French commission over exclusion from decisions, leading to ineffective representation, complaints to Congress, and his recall in 1779 without achieving any objectives. Morris explicitly mentioned this in September 7, 1787 debates as an instance where delays in appointments harmed U.S. interests under the Confederation.

The William Carmichael Debacle (1776-1782): Carmichael served as secretary to the French commission and later as chargé d’affaires to Spain. He faced accusations of financial mismanagement, unauthorized actions, and failure to secure treaties, compounded by poor coordination with Congress, resulting in stalled alliances and his eventual replacement.

These were not isolated incidents. They were systemic failures that shaped the Founders’ understanding of what happens when diplomatic power is exercised without proper appointment procedures: corruption, factionalism, ineffectiveness, and damaged credibility.

Hamilton’s Defense: The Senate as a Check on Favoritism

Alexander Hamilton, writing in Federalist No. 76 on April 1, 1788, explained the Appointments Clause’s purpose with remarkable clarity:

“It would be an excellent check upon a spirit of favoritism in the President, and would tend greatly to prevent the appointment of unfit characters from State prejudice, from family connection, from personal attachment, or from a view to popularity.”

Hamilton went further, describing exactly the kind of appointment the Founders feared:

“He would be both ashamed and afraid to bring forward, for the most distinguished or lucrative stations, candidates who had no other merit than that of coming from the same State to which he particularly belonged, or of being in some way or other personally allied to him, or of possessing the necessary insignificance and pliancy to render them the obsequious instruments of his pleasure.“

Read that last phrase again: “obsequious instruments of his pleasure.” Hamilton was warning against exactly what we see with Witkoff—a personally connected loyalist, selected not for diplomatic expertise but for personal trust and willingness to execute the President’s will without independent judgment.

In Federalist No. 77, Hamilton warned of the specific danger of appointment systems that lack proper checks:

“To satisfy the private attachments of a dozen, or of twenty men, would occasion a monopoly of all the principal employments of the government in a few families, and would lead more directly to an aristocracy or an oligarchy than any measure that could be contrived.”

This was not abstract theorizing. Hamilton was describing a concrete danger: government positions becoming tools of personal patronage rather than public service.

Washington’s Warning: Foreign Influence and Diplomatic Appointments

George Washington, in his Farewell Address of September 19, 1796, issued a warning that resonates powerfully in the context of Witkoff’s role:

“Against the insidious wiles of foreign influence (I conjure you to believe me, fellow-citizens) the jealousy of a free people ought to be constantly awake, since history and experience prove that foreign influence is one of the most baneful foes of republican government.”

Washington continued:

“It opens the door to foreign influence and corruption, which finds a facilitated access to the government itself through the channels of party passions. Thus the policy and the will of one country are subjected to the policy and will of another.”

And most pointedly:

“And it gives to ambitious, corrupted, or deluded citizens (who devote themselves to the favorite nation), facility to betray or sacrifice the interests of their own country, without odium, sometimes even with popularity.”

Washington was describing how foreign powers work: they identify Americans with personal connections, financial interests, or ideological alignment—and use those as channels of influence. The Appointments Clause, with its Senate consent requirement, was designed precisely to create a vetting process that would identify and block such vulnerabilities.

When we see an envoy with:

Massive real estate holdings recently divested (potential future interests)
Ongoing stakes in cryptocurrency ventures with UAE investment (World Liberty Financial)
No completed ethics review (unsigned disclosure)
Personal closeness to the President (golfing partner, real estate colleague)
Operating in negotiations involving countries where he held business interests

We are seeing exactly the vulnerability profile Washington warned about.

The Constitutional Framework: Three Tiers of Appointment

The Appointments Clause establishes a three-tier system:

Principal Officers (including ambassadors and “other public Ministers”): Require presidential nomination and Senate confirmation.
Inferior Officers: Congress may authorize appointment by the President alone, department heads, or courts—but only if the officer is supervised and limited in authority.
Employees: Those who lack “significant authority” and perform routine functions; not subject to Appointments Clause.

The Supreme Court has defined the critical line between officers and employees. In Buckley v. Valeo (1976), the Court held that officers are those who exercise “significant authority pursuant to the laws of the United States.” When Federal Election Commission members wielded enforcement power, they were officers requiring proper appointment—and their appointment by Congress violated the Clause.

Later cases refined this framework:

Morrison v. Olson (1988): An independent counsel was an inferior officer because, despite substantial powers, she had limited jurisdiction, temporary tenure, and was removable by a higher executive official.
Edmond v. United States (1997): Coast Guard judges were inferior officers because they were supervised by a department head with final review authority. The key test: inferior officers are “directed and supervised” by others within a “superior hierarchy.”
Lucia v. SEC (2018): SEC administrative law judges were officers requiring proper appointment when they wielded significant authority in rendering initial decisions, even when subject to review.

The doctrine is clear: If you exercise sovereign authority on behalf of the United States—negotiating binding agreements, committing U.S. policy, representing U.S. positions to foreign governments—you are an officer and must be properly appointed under the Appointments Clause.

The Modern Doctrinal Test: When a Special Envoy Becomes a Principal Officer

Synthesizing Buckley, Edmond, Lucia, and relevant Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) opinions yields a clear two-phase test:

Phase 1: Officer Status

A position is an “office” subject to the Appointments Clause only if it involves:

(a) Exercise of “significant authority pursuant to the laws of the United States” (Buckley, 424 U.S. at 126)—substantial, non-advisory authority tied to federal law, such as rulemaking, enforcement, adjudication, or diplomatic representation that binds the government or third parties.

(b) A “continuing” role with delegated sovereign power, rather than a transient or personal delegation (Officers of the United States Within the Meaning of the Appointments Clause, 31 Op. O.L.C. 73, 100-05 (2007)).

The OLC has clarified that diplomatic roles “inherently involve sovereign powers (e.g., representing the U.S. abroad), but only ‘continuing’ positions qualify as offices. Temporary ‘special agents’ for discrete missions (e.g., ad hoc treaty negotiations) are not offices,” drawing on historical practice like President Washington’s unilateral dispatch of agents for single missions. However, if the role persists beyond a single task—e.g., ongoing negotiations across multiple countries and crises—it becomes continuing and thus an office.

Phase 2: Principal vs. Inferior Officer

If an office exists, it is principal (requiring Senate confirmation) unless it is “inferior,” meaning the officer is “directed and supervised” by a superior principal officer within a hierarchical chain (Edmond, 520 U.S. at 662-63).

Key indicators of principal officer status:

Direct reporting to the President without departmental intermediation
Broad discretion in executing policy without routine oversight
Authority to make commitments on behalf of the United States
No effective review or override by a superior in the chain of command

As the 2007 OLC Opinion notes, “envoys with broad discretion and minimal oversight (e.g., no routine State Department review) are principal if their authority is not ‘subordinate.’” Direct Presidential access without State Department oversight signals principal status, because the President cannot “supervise” themselves hierarchically.

The Test Applied: What Makes Someone an Envoy Under the Law

Standard Key Criteria Application to Special Envoys Buckley/Lucia (Officer Status) Significant authority pursuant to law; discretionary sovereign acts in continuing role High-level negotiations binding U.S. interests qualify; advisory trips do not Edmond (Principal vs. Inferior) Directed/supervised by superior; effective review hierarchy Direct Presidential access without State Dept. oversight = principal OLC (Synthesis) Continuing vs. transient; sovereign delegation Ad hoc missions = no office; ongoing diplomacy across multiple crises = principal if unsupervised

Statutory Requirements: The Envoy Regime

Beyond constitutional requirements, Congress has enacted detailed statutes governing diplomatic appointments:

22 U.S.C. § 3927 requires that chiefs of mission—ambassadors and envoys who lead U.S. diplomatic efforts in foreign countries or on specific issues—be “appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.”

22 U.S.C. § 2651a authorizes the Secretary of State to establish special positions but ties them to the constitutional confirmation framework for those exercising ambassadorial-level authority.

22 U.S.C. § 3942 requires Senate confirmation for Senior Foreign Service appointments at ranks equivalent to ambassadors.

The 2023 Reform: Section 5105 and the New Special Envoy Rules

Recognizing that presidents had increasingly used unconfirmed “special envoys” and “czars” to conduct high-level diplomacy outside normal channels, Congress enacted reforms in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022 (Pub. L. 117-263, § 5105). These provisions became effective January 3, 2023.

Section 5105 establishes a clear framework:

Temporary appointments without confirmation are permitted for special envoys, representatives, and coordinators at the State Department—but only for up to 180 days, with advance notification to Congress.
Extensions up to 360 days are allowed with justification—but require 30-day advance notice.
Beyond 360 days, or for positions exercising “significant authority,” Senate confirmation is mandatory.
The statute defines “significant authority” using the Buckley standard: positions that exercise sovereign power in executing U.S. law and policy.

This is not an internal policy or guideline. It is statutory law—enacted by Congress and binding on the Executive Branch.

What a Real Envoy’s Paper Trail Looks Like

When the United States properly appoints a special envoy or ambassador to conduct high-level diplomacy, certain formal steps occur:

Presidential nomination submitted to the Senate, with a nomination number and referral to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
Senate confirmation hearing, questioning, and committee vote
Full Senate floor vote for confirmation
Formal swearing-in as an officer of the United States
Presence on official rosters: State Department organizational charts, the Diplomatic List published by State’s Office of Protocol
Written delegation of authority: Letters of credence, formal instructions, documented scope of portfolio
Ethics review and certification: Complete financial disclosure, conflicts review, and signed approval by the Office of Government Ethics or designated ethics official

These are not mere formalities. They are the institutional safeguards that ensure accountability, prevent corruption, and maintain the constitutional separation of powers. They are how we distinguish lawful official authority from private influence peddling.

They are the mechanisms designed to prevent exactly what the Founders experienced with Silas Deane and Arthur Lee—and exactly what Hamilton warned about when he spoke of “obsequious instruments” appointed through “personal attachment.”

Section 2: The Paper Trail That Isn’t There

Now let us examine the documentary record for Steve Witkoff against these standards.

What Exists

On November 12, 2024, President-elect Trump announced Witkoff’s designation: “I am pleased to announce that Steven C. Witkoff will serve as my Special Envoy to the Middle East.” The announcement appeared on the official presidency.ucsb.edu archive.

State Department briefings in 2025 refer to him as “Special Envoy” in contexts ranging from Gaza to Ukraine. Trump himself has repeatedly called Witkoff “my Special Envoy” in public statements and social media posts.

On August 13, 2025, Witkoff filed a financial disclosure form noting divestment of approximately $120 million in real estate holdings but retention of interests in World Liberty Financial (WLFI), a cryptocurrency venture with UAE investment ties.

What Does Not Exist

No Senate nomination. A search of the Senate’s official nominations tracker (senate.gov) reveals no nomination of Steven Witkoff for any position. No nomination number. No referral to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

No confirmation hearing or vote. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee has held no hearing on Witkoff. The full Senate has cast no vote.

No presence on the Diplomatic List. The State Department publishes an official Diplomatic List of accredited foreign diplomats and U.S. chiefs of mission. Witkoff does not appear in any 2025 edition.

No Section 5105 notifications. The statute requires 15-day advance notice for temporary envoy appointments and 30-day notice for extensions. No such notifications appear in the public Congressional Record or committee disclosures.

No completed ethics certification. The August 2025 financial disclosure remains unsigned by the designated ethics official—a remarkable gap for someone conducting negotiations involving countries where he held recent business interests. Senators Warren and Murphy have specifically highlighted this deficiency in their letter questioning whether Witkoff’s financial entanglements create incentives to shape U.S. policy in ways that benefit his business interests or those of his financial partners.

No evidence of State Department organizational placement. Official State Department organizational charts do not list Witkoff in any bureau or office structure.

No formal delegation of authority. There is no public letter of credence, no written instructions defining his authority, no documented scope of portfolio.

The Contrast: How It Should Look

When President Biden appointed former Senator George Mitchell as a special envoy for Middle East peace in 2009, Mitchell was:

Nominated to the Senate
Confirmed through the constitutional process
Sworn in as an officer
Listed on State Department rosters
Subject to full ethics review with signed disclosure

When Trump appointed his first Special Representative for Iran Policy (Brian Hook) in his first term, Hook was:

Given a formal State Department position
Subject to statutory notification requirements
Included in official organizational structures
Operating with documented authority

The infrastructure exists. It is used routinely. It is absent for Steve Witkoff.

The “Missing Infrastructure” Argument

This is not an oversight. This is a pattern. Everything you would expect to see for a lawful envoy exercising sovereign authority is missing:

Required Element Status for Witkoff Constitutional/Statutory Basis Senate nomination ❌ Absent Art. II, § 2, cl. 2 Senate confirmation ❌ Absent Art. II, § 2, cl. 2 Section 5105 notification ❌ Absent NDAA FY2022, § 5105 Diplomatic List entry ❌ Absent 22 U.S.C. § 3927; State practice State Dept org chart ❌ Absent 22 U.S.C. § 2651a Completed ethics review ❌ Unsigned 5 C.F.R. § 2635; 18 U.S.C. § 208 Written delegation ❌ Absent Standard diplomatic practice

The pattern reveals a deliberate choice to operate around the constitutional and statutory framework rather than within it.

This is precisely what the Senate consent requirement was designed to prevent—and precisely what the Founders’ bitter experience with Silas Deane, Arthur Lee, and William Carmichael taught them would happen without proper appointment procedures.

Section 3: The Witkoff Mission—Gaza, Moscow, and the Ukraine Track

To assess whether Witkoff’s activities trigger Appointments Clause scrutiny under the Buckley–Edmond–Lucia framework, we must examine what he has actually done. The test asks whether he exercises “significant authority pursuant to the laws of the United States”—sovereign power to commit U.S. policy and represent U.S. positions to foreign governments—in a continuing role without effective supervision.

The timeline is extensive and demonstrates sustained, multi-theater diplomatic activity:

Gaza: Ceasefire Broker (January-August 2025)

January 15, 2025 (Tel Aviv/Gaza): Witkoff meets with Prime Minister Netanyahu and enters the Gaza Strip to oversee ceasefire implementation. Israeli officials describe him as the “U.S. envoy” pushing the deal. He exercises on-ground authority conducting inspections in active conflict zones—a classic sovereign function. This is not advisory work; this is operational oversight of a U.S.-brokered agreement.

January 29, 2025 (Riyadh/Gaza): Saudi readouts call him “the American envoy.” He inspects the Netzarim corridor, a highly sensitive military zone. Palestinian sources describe him as exercising “U.S. representative” authority in assessing humanitarian corridors.

July 24, 2025 (Doha): After proximity talks collapse, Witkoff leads the U.S. decision to withdraw from negotiations, publicly citing Hamas bad faith. Qatari and State Department statements describe him directing U.S. policy in real time. This is not relaying decisions made elsewhere—this is making the decision.

August 2025 (Multiple Gaza trips): Continued inspection tours with Ambassador Huckabee, described in Palestinian and Israeli readouts as the “U.S. representative” assessing humanitarian corridors and ceasefire implementation.

Moscow: Prisoner Swaps and Ukraine Negotiations (February-December 2025)

February 1, 2025 (Moscow): Witkoff spends five hours meeting with Vladimir Putin. Russian official readouts call him “the U.S. special envoy.” He secures the release of Marc Fogel, a U.S. citizen—a consular function traditionally exercised by properly appointed diplomatic officers. The New York Times reports he outlined potential U.S. positions on sanctions relief and territorial questions—core foreign policy commitments that bind U.S. negotiating positions.

May 14, 2025 (Kremlin): Additional meetings described as yielding “constructive” outcomes on war termination. AP News reports Witkoff as leading U.S. talks on Ukraine peace—not facilitating, not advising, but leading.

December 2, 2025 (Moscow): A second marathon session with Putin, this time accompanied by Jared Kushner. Russian statements describe detailed discussions of “U.S. peace proposals” for Ukraine, including territorial concessions and security guarantees. Al Jazeera, NBC News, CNN, DW, and The Guardian all report this as Witkoff acting as Trump’s “global fixer” and direct confidant, operating without evident State Department intermediation.

This is not information-gathering. This is negotiation of binding U.S. positions.

Ukraine Track: Miami and Hallandale Beach (October-November 2025)

October 2025 (Miami): Witkoff hosts Dmitry Dmitriev, a Russian special representative, along with Kushner for Ukraine peace drafts. Reuters reports leaked transcripts suggesting discussions of sanctions relief mechanisms—a matter that requires Treasury, State, and Congressional coordination under U.S. law. Witkoff appears to be shaping these positions without formal State Department oversight.

November 30, 2025 (Hallandale Beach, Florida): Ukrainian delegation meets with Witkoff to review peace plan provisions. Ukrainian readouts call him “Trump’s envoy.” State Department public schedule confirms the meeting. But here is the crucial question: On whose authority does he purport to negotiate terms affecting Ukrainian territory?

Iran Nuclear Talks (March-May 2025)

April 12, 2025 (Oman): Leads initial round of Iran nuclear negotiations. Omani statements describe him as “U.S. representative.” Nuclear non-proliferation negotiations involve the most sensitive national security commitments the United States can make.

May 23, 2025 (Rome): Fifth round with senior officials. Italian Foreign Ministry describes him as “U.S. special envoy.” This is sustained, multi-month negotiation on core national security issues.

Applying the Doctrinal Framework

Now let us apply the Buckley–Edmond–Lucia framework systematically:

Phase 1: Officer Status (Buckley/Lucia Standard)

Question 1: Does Witkoff exercise “significant authority pursuant to the laws of the United States”?

✓ Yes. He negotiates binding or policy commitments on behalf of the United States—ceasefires, prisoner releases, peace frameworks, nuclear talks. These acts are tied to executive foreign affairs powers under Article II and laws like the International Emergency Economic Powers Act. In Buckley, the test was whether actions bind the government or third parties through discretionary sovereign power. Witkoff’s activities qualify: his decisions on withdrawing from Gaza talks, his outlining of U.S. positions to Putin, his negotiation of prisoner releases—these are exercises of sovereign power.

✓ Lucia Standard: Witkoff’s discretion mirrors Lucia‘s administrative law judges. He independently shapes U.S. strategy in what The Atlantic called “neophyte diplomat” capacity, making decisions without evident State Department intermediation. His role involves “significant discretion” in representing U.S. interests in ways that could lead to executive agreements—exactly the kind of discretionary diplomatic power Lucia identified as hallmark officer authority.

Question 2: Is this a “continuing” role rather than a discrete, temporary mission?

✓ Yes. Unlike transient agents for single missions (which the OLC has said may not constitute an “office”), Witkoff’s role spans from November 2024 appointment through at least December 2025—over 13 months. His portfolio expanded from Middle East to Ukraine to Iran, involving repeated, multi-nation engagements across multiple crises. This far exceeds the ad hoc examples in the 2007 OLC Opinion. This is ongoing sovereign representation, not a discrete task.

Conclusion on Phase 1: Witkoff holds an “office” under the Appointments Clause.

Phase 2: Principal vs. Inferior Officer (Edmond Standard)

Question: Is Witkoff “directed and supervised” by a superior officer in an effective hierarchy?

✗ No. The evidence shows:

Direct Presidential reporting: As Trump’s “golfing partner” and personal confidant (The Guardian, May 30, 2025), Witkoff reports directly to the President
No State Department oversight: His activities involve no evident routine departmental review. He operates from the White House or personal locations (Miami, Hallandale Beach), not within State’s bureaucratic structure
No hierarchical review: His decisions—like the July 2025 Gaza withdrawal—are not subject to State Department approval or override
Independent authority: His Putin meetings are framed as Presidential envoy sessions, with decisions not requiring departmental clearance

This mirrors the presumptively principal status of ambassadors, not the supervised status of inferior consuls. As Edmond established, the President cannot “supervise” himself hierarchically. When an envoy has direct Presidential access without departmental intermediation, that signals principal officer status.

Conclusion on Phase 2: Witkoff exercises the authority of a principal officer.

The Section 5105 Analysis

Even if one argued that Witkoff somehow qualifies as an “inferior” officer (though the evidence contradicts this), Section 5105’s statutory framework creates additional barriers:

His role exceeds 360 days (November 2024-December 2025 = 13+ months)
No temporary appointment notification appears in the Congressional Record
No extension justification has been filed
His authority is clearly “significant” under the statutory standard

Whether analyzed under constitutional doctrine or post-2023 statutory requirements, the conclusion is the same: Witkoff’s appointment is defective.

The “Significant Authority” Pattern

Let us be concrete about what “significant authority” means in Witkoff’s case:

Activity Date Sovereign Function Evidence of Authority Gaza ceasefire oversight Jan 2025 Implementing U.S.-brokered agreement Israeli readouts: “U.S. envoy” Marc Fogel release Feb 2025 Consular/prisoner negotiation Russian statements: “U.S. special envoy” Ukraine talks with Putin Dec 2025 Negotiating war termination terms NYT, CNN, Al Jazeera: “leading U.S. talks” Gaza talks withdrawal July 2025 Policy decision-making State Dept/Qatari readouts: Witkoff “directs” U.S. withdrawal Iran nuclear negotiations Apr-May 2025 Non-proliferation commitments Omani/Italian statements: “U.S. representative” Sanctions relief discussions Oct 2025 Economic statecraft Reuters: leaked transcripts show policy shaping

Every single one of these activities involves the exercise of sovereign power—making commitments, representing U.S. positions, directing U.S. policy decisions—that Buckley identified as the hallmark of officer status.

Section 4: No Authority to Speak for Ukraine

The analysis thus far has focused on whether Witkoff can lawfully represent the United States. But his activities raise an even more fundamental problem: He purports to negotiate terms affecting Ukraine—yet Ukraine has not authorized him to do so.

This is not a technical point. It is a bedrock principle of international law and state sovereignty.

Basic Sovereignty Principles

Under customary international law, reflected in the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations and the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties:

Only the sending state decides who represents it in negotiations with foreign governments
Only the represented state can authorize someone to negotiate on its behalf
A third party cannot unilaterally claim authority to represent a state in negotiations about that state’s territory, sovereignty, or security

Ukraine is an independent, sovereign nation with:

An elected President (Volodymyr Zelenskyy)
A functioning government exercising constitutional authority
A Ministry of Foreign Affairs that manages its diplomatic relations under Ukrainian law
Legal authority under its own constitution to determine who speaks for Ukraine in international negotiations

What Ukraine Says

There is zero evidence that Ukraine’s government has empowered Steve Witkoff to represent Ukrainian interests in any capacity.

To the contrary, reporting from the Kyiv Independent (November 23, 2025) and Ukrainian sources suggests alarm at Witkoff’s role, particularly regarding the November 30, 2025 Hallandale Beach meeting. Ukrainian officials have expressed concern that “peace proposals” are being negotiated about Ukraine without Ukraine’s full participation or consent—a violation of the “nothing about Ukraine without Ukraine” principle that President Zelenskyy has insisted upon throughout the war.

The Legal Absurdity

When Witkoff sits down with Russian representatives to discuss:

Ukrainian territorial concessions
Security guarantees affecting Ukrainian sovereignty
Sanctions relief that impacts Ukraine’s negotiating leverage
Peace terms that would bind Ukraine’s future

He may be a negotiator about Ukraine, but he is not—and cannot be—a negotiator for Ukraine.

This is not a legal gray area. This is clear-cut.

The principle is simple: Donald Trump is not the President of Ukraine. He has no constitutional or international legal authority to decide who speaks for Kyiv. Any “appointment” of Witkoff to “represent Ukraine” would be void as a matter of law—as invalid as if Putin appointed someone to represent the United States.

Ukraine’s sovereignty means that:

Only Ukraine’s government, through its constitutional processes, can authorize representatives
Only Ukraine’s Foreign Ministry can issue credentials for diplomatic negotiations
Only Ukraine’s elected leadership can consent to territorial or sovereignty arrangements

Any “deal” Witkoff negotiates that purports to bind Ukraine—absent Ukraine’s sovereign consent through its own constitutional procedures—would lack legal effect under international law.

The Distinction That Matters

There is a world of difference between:

Negotiating WITH Ukraine about ending the war (legitimate if properly appointed by the United States)

and

Negotiating FOR Ukraine about Ukraine’s territory (legally impossible without Ukrainian authorization)

Witkoff appears to be attempting both—properly appointed for neither.

When he meets with Russian representatives and discusses terms that would affect Ukraine’s territory, sovereignty, and security, he is acting as if he has authority to bind Ukrainian interests. He does not. He cannot. No American, no matter how close to the President, can claim to represent Ukraine in negotiations about Ukraine’s future.

Section 5: The “Personal Representative” Dodge

Anticipating these arguments, the Trump administration might offer several defenses. Each is legally inadequate.

Defense #1: “He’s just a personal representative, not an officer”

The argument: Witkoff is merely a “personal envoy” of the President, like a staff aide or advisor. He holds no “office” created by law, so the Appointments Clause doesn’t apply. He’s just carrying messages and gathering information on the President’s behalf.

Why this fails:

The Supreme Court has rejected formalistic labels in favor of functional analysis. In Buckley v. Valeo, the Court didn’t ask what the FEC commissioners were called—it asked what authority they exercised.

If Witkoff walks like an ambassador (negotiating with foreign governments), talks like an ambassador (conveying U.S. policy positions as binding commitments), and is treated by foreign states like an ambassador (official readouts from Israel, Russia, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Oman, Italy, Egypt, and Ukraine all calling him “U.S. envoy” or “American representative”), then he is functionally exercising ambassadorial authority.

The Constitution does not say “Ambassadors and other public Ministers, unless the President calls them ‘personal representatives.’” It says “Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls” require Senate confirmation—precisely the language the Founders chose after their bitter experience with unvetted envoys like Silas Deane.

Moreover, Hamilton specifically warned against this dodge in Federalist No. 76:

“He would be both ashamed and afraid to bring forward, for the most distinguished or lucrative stations, candidates who had no other merit than that of… being in some way or other personally allied to him, or of possessing the necessary insignificance and pliancy to render them the obsequious instruments of his pleasure.“

The “personal representative” label is not a legal category—it is exactly the kind of euphemism Hamilton warned would be used to evade Senate oversight. Calling someone a “personal envoy” while giving them ambassadorial authority does not make them any less an officer under the Constitution.

The very concept of sustained, multi-crisis “personal envoys” exercising sovereign power is what Congress sought to regulate in Section 5105. The statute’s purpose would be defeated if every envoy could be reclassified as “personal” to evade oversight.

Defense #2: “He’s not at the State Department, so Section 5105 doesn’t apply”

The argument: Section 5105 applies to envoys “at the Department of State.” Witkoff is based at the White House/Executive Office of the President, so he falls outside the statute’s jurisdictional reach. This is a matter of textual interpretation.

Why this fails:

First, this is a formalistic dodge. The statute’s purpose is to ensure accountability for positions exercising significant diplomatic authority. Congress enacted Section 5105 in 2022 specifically to address the proliferation of unconfirmed envoys conducting high-level diplomacy. Allowing the White House to simply house envoys under its own roof to evade statutory requirements would render Section 5105 meaningless—a textbook example of defeating legislative purpose through technicality.

Second, State Department resources and channels are being used for Witkoff’s missions. State Department press briefings reference his activities. State Department public schedules document his meetings. He coordinates with State officials. Official State Department statements describe him as “U.S. Special Envoy” in contexts from Gaza to Ukraine. The line between “White House envoy” and “State envoy” blurs in practice—which is precisely why the distinction cannot bear the constitutional weight being placed on it.

Third, and most fundamentally, even if Section 5105 doesn’t technically reach White House envoys, the Appointments Clause still does. The Appointments Clause is in the Constitution itself—not a statute that can be evaded through organizational placement. You cannot dodge constitutional requirements by moving an officer from one building to another. The Founders did not write “Ambassadors and other public Ministers require Senate consent, unless they work in the White House.”

Defense #3: “Presidents have always used informal diplomats”

The argument: Historical practice tolerates ad hoc agents for limited missions. Nixon sent Kissinger on secret backchannel missions. Johnson used intermediaries in Vietnam. Theodore Roosevelt used personal envoys for treaty negotiations. This is normal statecraft, well within presidential prerogative.

Why this fails:

Yes, presidents have occasionally used informal channels for narrow, temporary purposes—usually exploratory talks or message-passing. But there are critical distinctions that make Witkoff’s role categorically different:

Duration: Most historical backchannels were time-limited. Kissinger’s secret Paris trips to negotiate with North Vietnam were discrete missions, not a 13-month roving ambassadorship across multiple conflicts. The 2007 OLC Opinion specifically distinguishes between ad hoc single-mission agents (which may escape officer status) and “continuing” diplomatic roles (which do not).

Authority: Many informal agents served as messengers conveying U.S. positions developed by the formal diplomatic apparatus, not as negotiators independently shaping and committing U.S. policy. They carried instructions—they didn’t write them. Witkoff’s July 2025 decision to withdraw from Gaza talks, his October 2025 discussions of sanctions relief mechanisms, his December 2025 presentation of “U.S. peace proposals” to Putin—these are acts of policy-making authority, not message delivery.

Scope: Historical practice tolerated narrow backchannels for specific negotiations, not wholesale substitution of unconfirmed envoys for the entire formal diplomatic structure. Witkoff has operated simultaneously on:

Gaza ceasefire implementation
Ukraine-Russia peace negotiations
Iran nuclear talks
Prisoner release negotiations
Sanctions policy discussions

This is not a backchannel. This is a parallel diplomatic structure.

Modern law: Critically, Section 5105 represents Congress’s explicit rejection of the normalization of long-term, high-authority informal envoys. Post-2023, the legal landscape has changed. Congress studied the problem, identified the risks, and passed legislation specifically to regulate this practice. The administration cannot simply ignore a statute by invoking pre-statute historical practice.

The Pattern: Kushner, Giuliani, Grenell, and Now Witkoff

This is not unique to Witkoff. It is a deliberate pattern across Trump administrations:

Jared Kushner (Trump I): Unconfirmed “senior advisor” conducting Middle East diplomacy, negotiating the Abraham Accords without Senate confirmation. Congressional Research Service flagged Appointments Clause risks. Kushner later received $2 billion from Saudi Arabia for his private equity fund—raising questions about whether his diplomatic role created financial opportunities.

Rudy Giuliani (Trump I): Operating as Trump’s “personal lawyer” to pressure Ukraine on Biden investigations, conducting shadow diplomacy that triggered impeachment. No formal diplomatic role. Logan Act discussed but never prosecuted due to the Act’s dormancy.

Richard Grenell (Trump I): Unconfirmed special envoy for Serbia-Kosovo talks while simultaneously serving as Acting Director of National Intelligence. CRS and GAO flagged concerns about dual roles and lack of statutory notification.

Each case followed the same script: High-level diplomatic activity conducted by presidential cronies without Senate confirmation or statutory compliance, justified as “personal” or “informal” representation.

Hamilton warned about exactly this in Federalist No. 77:

“Whether a governor… avails himself of the ascendant he must necessarily have, in this delicate and important part of the administration, to prefer to offices men who are best qualified for them, or whether he prostitutes that advantage to the advancement of persons whose chief merit is their implicit devotion to his will, and to the support of a despicable and dangerous system of personal influence, are questions which, unfortunately for the community, can only be the subjects of speculation and conjecture.”

The result of this pattern: A creeping normalization of unaccountable, privatized foreign policy where constitutional checks are treated as optional inconveniences rather than binding requirements.

The Founders’ Fear Realized

The Founders designed the Appointments Clause specifically to prevent what they had witnessed under the Articles of Confederation and what Hamilton articulated in the Federalist Papers:

Silas Deane: Appointed without proper oversight, engaged in self-dealing and corruption
Arthur Lee: Uncoordinated appointment led to factional infighting that undermined diplomacy
William Carmichael: Financial mismanagement and unauthorized actions without accountability

Hamilton’s warning about “obsequious instruments” selected through “personal attachment” rather than merit was not abstract. It was based on concrete experience.

Witkoff’s appointment embodies precisely what the Founders feared:

Selected for personal loyalty and trust, not diplomatic expertise
Operating without Senate vetting that might expose conflicts or vulnerabilities
Exercising sovereign power without institutional accountability
Creating channels for potential foreign influence through business connections

This is not how legitimate governance works. This is how captured states work—where public authority is exercised by private fixers accountable only to a single patron.

Section 6: Why This Matters—Legitimacy, Oversight, and Capture

This is not merely an academic exercise in constitutional law. The absence of lawful authority for Witkoff creates concrete, tangible problems:

1. Legal Vulnerability of Agreements

Any “deal” Witkoff negotiates faces foundational legitimacy questions. Under the Appointments Clause doctrine established in Buckley and its progeny, actions taken by improperly appointed officers may be voidable.

While the Supreme Court has sometimes applied a de facto officer doctrine to preserve governmental continuity, that doctrine typically protects third parties who reasonably relied on an officer’s apparent authority—not the government itself. A future administration, Congress, or affected parties could challenge agreements negotiated by Witkoff on the grounds that he lacked lawful authority to bind the United States.

International agreements negotiated by improperly appointed agents may be voidable under both U.S. law and international law principles. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties recognizes that a state may invoke improper representation as grounds to avoid treaty obligations. While political realities may override these legal concerns in some cases, the cloud of illegitimacy remains.

2. Congressional Oversight Eviscerated

When envoys are properly appointed and confirmed, Congress has clear oversight authority:

Senate confirmation hearings establish baseline expectations and create a public record of commitments
Regular reporting requirements tied to appropriations ensure ongoing transparency
Appropriations leverage allows Congress to condition funding on compliance with policy directives
Impeachment power applies to “Officers of the United States” who abuse their authority

Witkoff operates outside this entire oversight structure:

He has faced no confirmation hearing where Senators could question his qualifications, financial conflicts, or policy views
He files no regular reports to Congress about his activities or commitments
His budget (if any) is hidden in White House accounts or undisclosed appropriations
He cannot be impeached because he holds no formal office
Congress has minimal leverage to compel information or cooperation

This is not a bug—it is the point. Informal envoys exist precisely to evade congressional accountability. As Hamilton warned in Federalist No. 77:

“Every mere council of appointment, however constituted, will be a conclave, in which cabal and intrigue will have their full scope… The private attachments of one man might easily be satisfied; but to satisfy the private attachments of a dozen, or of twenty men, would occasion a monopoly of all the principal employments of the government in a few families.”

The erosion of Senate oversight enables exactly what Hamilton feared: policy conducted through personal connections rather than public accountability.

3. Ethics and Conflicts of Interest

Properly appointed officers undergo rigorous ethics review mandated by law:

Complete financial disclosures under the Ethics in Government Act
Conflicts of interest analysis under 18 U.S.C. § 208
Recusal requirements for matters affecting personal financial interests
Ongoing monitoring and certification by designated agency ethics officials
Criminal penalties for violations

Witkoff’s ethics situation presents multiple red flags:

Unsigned disclosure: His August 2025 financial disclosure—filed eight months after his appointment—remains unsigned by the designated ethics official. This is not a minor procedural irregularity. It means no independent ethics officer has certified that his financial holdings have been properly reviewed and that adequate safeguards are in place.

Cryptocurrency interests: He retains interests in World Liberty Financial (WLFI), a cryptocurrency venture with reported UAE investment ties. He has conducted diplomatic negotiations with UAE-related entities and in regions where cryptocurrency policy is contested.

Recent real estate divestment: While he reportedly divested approximately $120 million in real estate holdings, these sales create potential future dependencies—who purchased these assets? Were the sales at market value? Do the buyers have interests in regions where Witkoff now conducts diplomacy?

Pattern of business in negotiating regions: Witkoff has extensive prior business relationships in Middle Eastern countries where he now represents U.S. interests.

Senators Warren and Murphy specifically highlighted these concerns in their letter, questioning whether Witkoff’s financial entanglements create incentives to shape U.S. policy in ways that benefit his business interests or those of his financial partners.

Without proper ethics infrastructure—completed review, signed certification, documented recusals, ongoing monitoring—the risk of self-dealing and policy capture is heightened.

This is precisely what Washington warned about in his Farewell Address:

“And it gives to ambitious, corrupted, or deluded citizens (who devote themselves to the favorite nation), facility to betray or sacrifice the interests of their own country, without odium, sometimes even with popularity.”

4. The Appearance and Reality of State Capture

When policy is conducted by informal presidential cronies rather than confirmed officers operating within institutional structures, several pathologies emerge:

Transparency disappears. What instructions has Witkoff received? What commitments has he made in closed-door meetings with Putin? What understandings exist about future U.S. policy? Who reviews his conduct? These questions cannot be answered because the normal transparency mechanisms—Senate oversight, State Department reporting, inspector general review—do not apply.

Accountability evaporates. If Witkoff’s negotiations produce disastrous results, who is responsible? He holds no formal position from which he can be removed. He cannot be impeached. He faces no confirmation process that established public expectations. The normal mechanisms of democratic accountability simply don’t exist.

Private interests infiltrate public policy. The line between personal business relationships and diplomatic negotiations blurs. When someone with extensive Middle East business connections and ongoing cryptocurrency investments conducts negotiations in those same regions, every decision raises the question: Is this in America’s interest or his?

Institutional knowledge is bypassed. Career Foreign Service officers with decades of experience, language skills, and regional expertise are sidelined in favor of a real estate developer whose qualification appears to be personal loyalty to the President.

This is not how legitimate governance works. This is how captured states work—where public authority is exercised by private fixers operating in shadows, accountable only to a single patron.

Hamilton warned of exactly this danger in Federalist No. 76:

“Give us the man we wish for this office, and you shall have the one you wish for that. This will be the usual condition of the bargain. And it will rarely happen that the advancement of the public service will be the primary object either of party victories or of party negotiations.”

5. Damage to Institutional Norms and Democratic Legitimacy

Every informal envoy who operates without confirmation further erodes the norm that Senate oversight matters.

If Witkoff succeeds in brokering deals without accountability, future presidents—of both parties—will ask: Why bother with nominations and confirmations at all? Why subject appointees to Senate questioning when you can simply call them “personal representatives” and achieve the same results?

The Appointments Clause exists for a reason articulated clearly by the Founders: to prevent the concentration of unaccountable power in executive favorites. It is a structural safeguard against the dangers of favoritism, corruption, foreign influence, and personal enrichment that the Framers witnessed firsthand.

Every end-run around it weakens the constitutional structure. Every “personal envoy” who negotiates treaties without confirmation makes the next one easier to justify. Every unchecked appointment deepens the precedent.

The cumulative effect is a constitutional crisis by normalization—where violations become so routine they cease to be recognized as violations at all.

Section 7: Conclusion—A Man Without a Mandate

The documentary record is clear and damning:

Steve Witkoff has not been nominated by the President for Senate confirmation.

He has not been confirmed by the Senate.

No statutory notifications under Section 5105 appear in the public Congressional Record.

He does not appear on the State Department’s Diplomatic List or organizational charts.

His ethics disclosure remains unsigned by the designated ethics official.

He has no authority whatsoever from Ukraine to represent its interests.

Yet he negotiates ceasefires in Gaza. He meets with Putin for five hours to discuss Ukraine peace terms. He brokers prisoner releases. He sits in rooms with foreign officials and outlines “U.S. positions” on sanctions, security guarantees, and territorial questions. He makes policy decisions like withdrawing from Gaza negotiations. He shapes sanctions relief proposals. He conducts ongoing negotiations on Iran’s nuclear program.

Foreign governments from Israel to Russia, from Qatar to Oman, from Saudi Arabia to Ukraine, describe him in official communications as “the U.S. special envoy” or “American representative” acting with the authority of the United States government.

What the Law Requires

Under the constitutional and statutory framework that governs U.S. diplomatic representation:

The Appointments Clause requires that “Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls” be appointed with Senate advice and consent—a requirement forged from the Founders’ bitter experience with Silas Deane’s corruption, Arthur Lee’s factionalism, and William Carmichael’s mismanagement under the Articles of Confederation.

Supreme Court doctrine establishes that anyone exercising “significant authority pursuant to the laws of the United States” in a continuing capacity is an officer requiring proper appointment (Buckley v. Valeo), and that officers without effective hierarchical supervision are principal officers requiring Senate confirmation (Edmond v. United States).

Section 5105 mandates that special envoys at the State Department exercising significant authority either operate within strict time limits (180-360 days) with proper congressional notification, or obtain Senate confirmation.

Standard diplomatic practice requires nomination, confirmation, swearing-in, ethics certification, formal delegation of authority, and inclusion in official rosters.

What Exists for Witkoff

None of this.

The institutional infrastructure that makes someone a lawful representative of the United States in foreign affairs—the nominations, the confirmations, the notifications, the ethics reviews, the formal delegations—is entirely absent.

What exists instead is:

A November 2024 announcement calling him “Special Envoy”
Trump’s repeated personal references to “my Special Envoy”
State Department briefings that reference his activities
An unsigned ethics disclosure with concerning gaps
No formal appointment documents
No Senate involvement
No statutory compliance

What This Means

Steve Witkoff’s legal status is not that of a U.S. ambassador, public minister, or officer. It is, at most, that of a private citizen acting as a political fixer for the President—a “personal emissary” whose authority derives not from constitutional appointment but from proximity to power.

This is precisely what Hamilton warned against in Federalist No. 76 when he described the danger of appointees “possessing the necessary insignificance and pliancy to render them the obsequious instruments of his pleasure.”

This is precisely what the Founders experienced with Silas Deane—an unvetted envoy whose self-dealing damaged American credibility and demonstrated the need for Senate oversight.

This is precisely what Washington warned about in his Farewell Address—Americans “who devote themselves to the favorite nation” gaining “facility to betray or sacrifice the interests of their own country.”

The Specific Constitutional Defects

Under the Buckley–Edmond–Lucia framework applied to Witkoff’s documented conduct:

Phase 1 (Officer Status): Witkoff exercises significant authority pursuant to U.S. law—negotiating binding commitments, representing U.S. positions, making policy decisions—in a continuing role spanning 13+ months across multiple crises. He holds an “office” under the Appointments Clause.

Phase 2 (Principal vs. Inferior): He operates with direct Presidential access, without State Department hierarchical supervision, exercising independent discretionary authority in high-level negotiations. He is a principal officer requiring Senate confirmation.

Statutory Compliance: His role exceeds 360 days without Section 5105 notifications, and clearly involves “significant authority” under the statutory standard.

Conclusion: His appointment violates both the Appointments Clause and Section 5105.

The Ukraine Problem

Beyond his defective U.S. appointment, Witkoff faces an insurmountable legal barrier regarding Ukraine:

He has no authority from Ukraine to represent Ukrainian interests.

Ukraine is a sovereign state with its own elected government, its own foreign ministry, its own constitutional processes for authorizing representatives. Donald Trump cannot appoint someone to speak for Ukraine any more than Putin can appoint someone to speak for the United States.

When Witkoff discusses territorial concessions, security guarantees, or peace terms with Russian representatives, he may be negotiating about Ukraine, but he is not—and cannot be—negotiating for Ukraine.

Any claim to the contrary is not merely legally dubious. It is void as a matter of international law.

Why This Matters

This matters because:

Deals he negotiates may lack legal legitimacy if challenged on Appointments Clause grounds, creating instability and uncertainty.
Congress has diminished oversight over his activities, budgets, conflicts, and commitments—precisely what the Founders designed the Senate consent requirement to prevent.
Ethics safeguards are absent or incomplete, creating risks of self-dealing with his cryptocurrency interests, real estate connections, and business relationships in regions where he now conducts diplomacy.
Ukraine has not authorized him to represent its interests, making any claim he negotiates “for Ukraine” legally void and an affront to Ukrainian sovereignty.
The precedent is dangerous, further normalizing unaccountable, privatized foreign policy and eroding the constitutional separation of powers.
This embodies the exact dangers the Founders feared: favoritism over merit, vulnerability to foreign influence, lack of accountability, and the exercise of sovereign power by “obsequious instruments” selected for personal loyalty rather than qualification.

The Questions That Demand Answers

Congress, Ukraine, and U.S. allies should be asking straightforward questions:

If Steve Witkoff represents the United States in diplomatic negotiations, where is his Senate confirmation?

The Senate’s constitutional role in vetting and confirming ambassadors and public ministers exists for a reason—to prevent corruption, favoritism, and foreign influence. That role cannot be nullified by calling someone a “personal representative.”

If he exercises significant authority for more than 360 days, where is the Section 5105 notification and justification?

Congress enacted this statute in 2022 specifically to address the problem of long-term, high-authority envoys operating without confirmation. The statute is binding law, not a suggestion.

If he negotiates about Ukraine’s territory and sovereignty, where is Ukraine’s authorization?

Ukraine is a sovereign state. No American—regardless of presidential favor—can claim to speak for Ukraine without Ukrainian consent. The principle of “nothing about Ukraine without Ukraine” is not just rhetoric. It is law.

If he holds cryptocurrency interests and recent business connections in regions where he negotiates, where is the completed, signed ethics certification?

Ethics reviews exist to identify and manage conflicts of interest. An unsigned disclosure for someone conducting sensitive negotiations is not a minor oversight—it is a red flag.

If foreign governments treat him as the authoritative voice of U.S. policy, on what legal basis does he exercise that authority?

Authority in a constitutional republic derives from law, not from personal relationships. If Witkoff speaks for the United States, that authority must have a legal foundation. It does not.

The Verdict

On the law: Steve Witkoff exercises significant diplomatic authority without Senate confirmation, without Section 5105 compliance, and without the institutional infrastructure required for lawful U.S. representation. His status as an officer of the United States is constitutionally defective.

On Ukraine: He has zero legal authority to represent Ukraine in negotiations about Ukraine’s sovereignty, territory, or security. Any claim to do so is void as a matter of international law.

On accountability: He operates in a zone of minimal oversight, incomplete ethics review, and privatized access—precisely the danger the Appointments Clause was designed to prevent.

There is no lawful, accountable mandate for Steve Witkoff to represent the United States in diplomatic negotiations, and none at all for him to claim any capacity regarding Ukraine.

The Founders wrote the Appointments Clause, after bitter experience with unvetted envoys, to ensure that those who wield sovereign power on behalf of the United States do so with democratic legitimacy and institutional accountability.

Steve Witkoff has neither.

He is a man sent to negotiate peace without the authority of law, conducting diplomacy without the consent of the Senate, purporting to speak for a nation that has not empowered him, operating with conflicts of interest that remain unreviewed.

He is a man without a mandate.

And every deal he cuts, every commitment he makes, every position he stakes out carries the taint of that defect—not because of who he is or what he proposes, but because of what he fundamentally lacks: lawful authority to speak for the United States of America.

This is not how constitutional democracies conduct foreign policy.

This is not what the Founders designed.

This is not what the law permits.

And it must not become what Americans accept.

Sources and Endnotes

Constitutional and Statutory Texts

U.S. Constitution, Article II, Section 2, Clause 2 (Appointments Clause): https://constitution.congress.gov/browse/article-2/section-2/clause-2/
22 U.S.C. § 2651a (State Department organization): https://uscode.house.gov/view.xhtml?req=granuleid:USC-prelim-title22-section2651a
22 U.S.C. § 3927 (Chiefs of mission appointments): https://uscode.house.gov/view.xhtml?req=granuleid:USC-prelim-title22-section3927
22 U.S.C. § 3942 (Senior Foreign Service appointments): https://uscode.house.gov/view.xhtml?req=granuleid:USC-prelim-title22-section3942
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022, Section 5105 (Pub. L. 117-263): https://www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/senate-bill/1605/text
5 U.S.C. §§ 3345-3349 (Federal Vacancies Reform Act): https://uscode.house.gov/view.xhtml?path=/prelim@title5/part3/subtitleB/chapter33/subchapterIII&edition=prelim
18 U.S.C. § 208 (Conflicts of interest): https://uscode.house.gov/view.xhtml?req=granuleid:USC-prelim-title18-section208
18 U.S.C. § 953 (Logan Act): https://uscode.house.gov/view.xhtml?req=granuleid:USC-prelim-title18-section953
5 C.F.R. § 2635 (Ethics regulations): https://www.ecfr.gov/current/title-5/chapter-XVI/subchapter-B/part-2635

Supreme Court Cases

Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976)
Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988)
Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651 (1997)
Lucia v. SEC, 585 U.S. 237 (2018)
Seila Law LLC v. CFPB, 591 U.S. 197 (2020)

Founding Documents

Alexander Hamilton, Federalist No. 76 (April 1, 1788): https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Hamilton/01-04-02-0219
Alexander Hamilton, Federalist No. 77 (April 4, 1788): https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Hamilton/01-04-02-0220
Alexander Hamilton, Federalist No. 72 (March 21, 1788): https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Hamilton/01-04-02-0215
George Washington, Farewell Address (September 19, 1796): https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/05-20-02-0440-0002
Constitutional Convention Debates (September 1787): https://founders.archives.gov/

Executive Branch Legal Opinions

Office of Legal Counsel, “Officers of the United States Within the Meaning of the Appointments Clause,” 31 Op. O.L.C. 73 (2007): https://www.justice.gov/file/473461/download
Government Accountability Office, FVRA compliance letters (B-332995, 2021): https://www.gao.gov/products/b-332995

Congressional Research Service Reports

CRS Report R44946, “Special Envoys, Representatives, and Coordinators at the State Department” (2017, updated 2023): https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R44946
CRS Report R48481, “The Appointments Clause: Questions and Answers” (2025): https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R48481
CRS Report R40856, “Presidential Czars” (2014): https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R40856

Official Records

White House Statement on Witkoff Appointment (November 12, 2024): https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/statement-president-elect-donald-j-trump-announcing-the-appointment-steven-c-witkoff
U.S. Senate Nominations Tracker (no nomination for Witkoff found): https://www.senate.gov/pagelayout/legislative/one_item_and_teasers/nom_confc.htm
State Department Briefings (2025):
- https://www.state.gov/briefings/department-press-briefing-july-24-2025
- https://www.state.gov/releases/office-of-the-spokesperson/2025/11/public-schedule-november-30-2025
State Department Diplomatic List (no Witkoff listing): https://www.state.gov/diplomatic-list/

Ethics and Oversight

Warren-Murphy Letter on Witkoff Ethics Concerns (November 2025, referenced in evidence pack)
Office of Government Ethics Financial Disclosure Forms: https://www.whitehouse.gov/oge/financial-disclosures/
Witkoff Financial Disclosure (August 13, 2025, unsigned)

News Reporting

Al Jazeera, “Gaza ceasefire negotiations” (January 18, 2025); “Witkoff-Putin Moscow meeting” (December 2, 2025)
Reuters, “Witkoff Gaza inspection” (January 29, 2025); “Moscow Putin meeting” (December 2, 2025); “Miami Ukraine talks with Dmitriev” (October 2025)
The New York Times, “Witkoff Moscow negotiations with Putin” (December 2, 2025; February 1, 2025)
Associated Press, “Kremlin meeting yields constructive outcomes” (May 14, 2025)
NBC News, “Witkoff Ukraine negotiations” (December 3, 2025)
CNN, “Five-hour Putin summit” (December 2, 2025)
DW (Deutsche Welle), “Witkoff continuing diplomatic role” (December 2, 2025)
The Guardian, “Witkoff as Trump’s golfing partner and confidant” (May 30, 2025)
The Atlantic, “Neophyte diplomat Witkoff” (May 14, 2025)
PBS, “Doha talks withdrawal” (July 24, 2025)
Kyiv Independent, “Ukrainian concerns about Witkoff role” (November 23, 2025)
The Wall Street Journal, “Miami Ukraine talks” (November 29, 2025)
Times of Israel, “Gaza Phase 2 negotiations” (June 2025)

Historical Analysis

Ryan M. Scoville, “Ad Hoc Diplomats,” 109 Duke Law Journal 957 (2020): https://scholarship.law.duke.edu/dlj/vol69/iss5/2/

Prepared by: Constitutional and foreign policy analysis based on primary sources, Supreme Court precedent, statutory law, and documented public record.

Date: December 2025

Purpose: To provide a rigorous, fully-sourced legal and institutional analysis demonstrating that Steve Witkoff lacks lawful authority to represent the United States—and has no authority whatsoever to represent Ukraine—in diplomatic negotiations.